Not Vulnerable: Oracle Solaris 11.3 SRU9.4 OpenSSH OpenSSH 7.2p2 IBM OpenSSH for GPFS for Windows 3.5.0.31 FreeBSD FreeBSD 9.3-STABLE FreeBSD Freebsd 9.3-RELEASE-p39 FreeBSD Freebsd 10.3-RC2 FreeBSD Freebsd 10.2-STABLE FreeBSD Freebsd 10.2-RELEASE-p14 FreeBSD Freebsd 10.1-RELEASE-p31. Openssh Openssh version 4.7p1: Security vulnerabilities, exploits, vulnerability statistics, CVSS scores and references (e.g.: CVE-2009-1234 or 2010-1234 or 20101234) Log In Register. Gentoo Infra has openssh-4.7p1-r1 LPK running and in production use on several amd64 machines, and we haven't seen any problems. Comment 4 Piotr Stolc 2008-02-23 10:16:28 UTC The problem is with length of timet type (it is long - 4 bytes on 32-bit and 8 bytes on 64-bit archs).
OpenSSH is the premier connectivity tool for remote login with the SSH protocol. It encrypts all traffic to eliminate eavesdropping, connection hijacking, and other attacks. In addition, OpenSSH provides a large suite of secure tunneling capabilities, several authentication methods, and sophisticated configuration options. Config Files /.ssh/., /etc/ssh/sshconfig, and /etc/ssh/sshdconfig There are no required changes to any of these files. However, you may wish to view the /etc/ssh/ files and make any changes appropriate for the security of your system. One recommended change is that you disable root login via ssh.Execute the following command as the root user to disable root login via ssh.
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OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol version 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support.
Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots and purchased T-shirts or posters.
T-shirt, poster and CD sales directly support the project. Pictures and more information can be found at:
http://www.openbsd.org/tshirts.html and
http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html
For international orders use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order
and for European orders, use http://https.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/order.eu
Changes since OpenSSH 4.6:
Security bugs resolved in this release:
* Prevent ssh(1) from using a trusted X11 cookie if creation of an
untrusted cookie fails; found and fixed by Jan Pechanec.
Other changes, new functionality and fixes in this release:
* sshd(8) in new installations defaults to SSH Protocol 2 only.
Existing installations are unchanged.
* The SSH channel window size has been increased, and both ssh(1)
sshd(8) now send window updates more aggressively. These improves
performance on high-BDP (Bandwidth Delay Product) networks.
* ssh(1) and sshd(8) now preserve MAC contexts between packets, which
saves 2 hash calls per packet and results in 12-16% speedup for
arcfour256/hmac-md5.
* A new MAC algorithm has been added, UMAC-64 (RFC4418) as
'umac-64@openssh.com'. UMAC-64 has been measured to be
approximately 20% faster than HMAC-MD5.
* A -K flag was added to ssh(1) to set GSSAPIAuthentication=Yes
* Failure to establish a ssh(1) TunnelForward is now treated as a
fatal error when the ExitOnForwardFailure option is set.
* ssh(1) returns a sensible exit status if the control master goes
away without passing the full exit status. (bz #1261)
* The following bugs have been fixed in this release:
- When using a ProxyCommand in ssh(1), set the outgoing hostname with
gethostname(2), allowing hostbased authentication to work (bz #616)
- Make scp(1) skip FIFOs rather than hanging (bz #856)
- Encode non-printing characters in scp(1) filenames.
these could cause copies to be aborted with a 'protocol error'
(bz #891)
- Handle SIGINT in sshd(8) privilege separation child process to
ensure that wtmp and lastlog records are correctly updated
(bz #1196)
- Report GSSAPI mechanism in errors, for libraries that support
multiple mechanisms (bz #1220)
- Improve documentation for ssh-add(1)'s -d option (bz #1224)
- Rearrange and tidy GSSAPI code, removing server-only code being
linked into the client. (bz #1225)
- Delay execution of ssh(1)'s LocalCommand until after all forwadings
have been established. (bz #1232)
- In scp(1), do not truncate non-regular files (bz #1236)
- Improve exit message from ControlMaster clients. (bz #1262)
- Prevent sftp-server(8) from reading until it runs out of buffer
space, whereupon it would exit with a fatal error. (bz #1286)
* Portable OpenSSH bugs fixed:
- Fix multiple inclusion of paths.h on AIX 5.1 systems. (bz #1243)
- Implement getpeereid for Solaris using getpeerucred. Solaris
systems will now refuse ssh-agent(1) and ssh(1) ControlMaster
clients from different, non-root users (bz #1287)
- Fix compilation warnings by including string.h if found. (bz #1294)
- Remove redefinition of _res in getrrsetbyname.c for platforms that
already define it. (bz #1299)
- Fix spurious 'chan_read_failed for istate 3' errors from sshd(8),
a side-effect of the 'hang on exit' fix introduced in 4.6p1.
(bz #1306)
- pam_end() was not being called if authentication failed (bz #1322)
- Fix SELinux support when SELinux is in permissive mode. Previously
sshd(8) was treating SELinux errors as always fatal. (bz #1325)
- Ensure that pam_setcred(.., PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) is called before
pam_setcred(.., PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED), fixing pam_dhkeys.
(bz #1339)
- Fix privilege separation on QNX - pre-auth only, this platform does
not support file descriptior passing needed for post-auth privilege
separation. (bz #1343)
Thanks to everyone who has contributed patches, reported bugs and tested releases.
Checksums:
- SHA1 (openssh-4.7.tar.gz) = 9ebaab9b31e01bd0d04425dc23536bcc78f8d990
- SHA1 (openssh-4.7p1.tar.gz) = 58357db9e64ba6382bef3d73d1d386fcdc0508f4
Reporting Bugs:
- please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html
and http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/
OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.
_______________________________________________
openssh-unix-announce mailing list
openssh-unix-announce@mindrot.org
https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-announce
Update instructions
The problem can be corrected by updating your system to the following package versions:
Ubuntu 8.04
- openssh-server - 1:4.7p1-8ubuntu1.1
- openssh-client - 1:4.7p1-8ubuntu1.1
Ubuntu 7.10
Openssh 4.7p1 Exploit
- openssh-server - 1:4.6p1-5ubuntu0.3
- openssh-client - 1:4.6p1-5ubuntu0.3
Ubuntu 7.04
- openssh-server - 1:4.3p2-8ubuntu1.3
- openssh-client - 1:4.3p2-8ubuntu1.3
Drunk wallwatermelon gaming. Updating your system:
Openssh 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1 Protocol 2.0
Install the security updates
Once the update is applied, weak user keys will be automatically
rejected where possible (though they cannot be detected in all
cases). If you are using such keys for user authentication,
they will immediately stop working and will need to be replaced
(see step 3).OpenSSH host keys can be automatically regenerated when the
OpenSSH security update is applied. The update will prompt for
confirmation before taking this step.Update OpenSSH known_hosts files
The regeneration of host keys will cause a warning to be displayed
when connecting to the system using SSH until the host key is
updated in the known_hosts file. The warning will look like this:@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle
attack)! It is also possible that the RSA host key has just been
changed.In this case, the host key has simply been changed, and you
should update the relevant known_hosts file as indicated in the
error message.Check all OpenSSH user keys
The safest course of action is to regenerate all OpenSSH user
keys, except where it can be established to a high degree of
certainty that the key was generated on an unaffected system.Check whether your key is affected by running the ssh-vulnkey
tool, included in the security update. By default, ssh-vulnkey
will check the standard location for user keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa,
~/.ssh/id_dsa and ~/.ssh/identity), your authorized_keys file
(~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2), and the
system's host keys (/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key and
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key).To check all your own keys, assuming they are in the standard
locations (~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, or ~/.ssh/identity):$ ssh-vulnkey
To check all keys on your system:
$ sudo ssh-vulnkey -a Poetry portfoliocoach mcdonalds health class website.
To check a key in a non-standard location:
$ ssh-vulnkey /path/to/key
If ssh-vulnkey says 'Unknown (no blacklist information)',
then it has no information about whether that key is affected.
If in doubt, destroy the key and generate a new one.Regenerate any affected user keys
OpenSSH keys used for user authentication must be manually
regenerated, including those which may have since been
transferred to a different system after being generated.New keys can be generated using ssh-keygen, e.g.:
$ ssh-keygen
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter file in which to save the key (/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa):
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa.
Your public key has been saved in /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa.pub.
The key fingerprint is:
00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00 user@hostUpdate authorized_keys files (if necessary)
Once the user keys have been regenerated, the relevant public
keys must be propagated to any authorized_keys files on
remote systems. Be sure to delete the affected key.